From 22c622b0cf3dd0c813c7054d442da336674b9786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?=C3=98rjan=20Malde?= <red@foxi.me>
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 14:31:14 +0200
Subject: patches/fribidi/*.patch: merge fixes for
 CVE-2022-{25308,25309,25310}.
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Signed-off-by: Ørjan Malde <red@foxi.me>
---
 patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 97 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch
 create mode 100644 patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch
 create mode 100644 patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch

(limited to 'patches/fribidi')

diff --git a/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch b/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..052bfd79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From ad3a19e6372b1e667128ed1ea2f49919884587e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Akira TAGOH <akira@tagoh.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 17:30:12 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix the stack buffer overflow issue
+
+strlen() could returns 0. Without a conditional check for len,
+accessing S_ pointer with len - 1 may causes a stack buffer overflow.
+
+AddressSanitizer reports this like:
+==1219243==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdce043c1f at pc 0x000000403547 bp 0x7ffdce0
+43b30 sp 0x7ffdce043b28
+READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdce043c1f thread T0
+    #0 0x403546 in main ../bin/fribidi-main.c:393
+    #1 0x7f226804e58f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d58f)
+    #2 0x7f226804e648 in __libc_start_main_impl (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d648)
+    #3 0x4036f4 in _start (/tmp/fribidi/build/bin/fribidi+0x4036f4)
+
+Address 0x7ffdce043c1f is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 63 in frame
+    #0 0x4022bf in main ../bin/fribidi-main.c:193
+
+  This frame has 5 object(s):
+    [32, 36) 'option_index' (line 233)
+    [48, 52) 'base' (line 386)
+    [64, 65064) 'S_' (line 375) <== Memory access at offset 63 underflows this variable
+    [65328, 130328) 'outstring' (line 385)
+    [130592, 390592) 'logical' (line 384)
+
+This fixes https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/issues/181
+---
+ bin/fribidi-main.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bin/fribidi-main.c b/bin/fribidi-main.c
+index 3cf9fe1..3ae4fb6 100644
+--- a/bin/fribidi-main.c
++++ b/bin/fribidi-main.c
+@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ FRIBIDI_END_IGNORE_DEPRECATIONS
+ 	    S_[sizeof (S_) - 1] = 0;
+ 	    len = strlen (S_);
+ 	    /* chop */
+-	    if (S_[len - 1] == '\n')
++	    if (len > 0 && S_[len - 1] == '\n')
+ 	      {
+ 		len--;
+ 		S_[len] = '\0';
diff --git a/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch b/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3dc9fd95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From f22593b82b5d1668d1997dbccd10a9c31ffea3b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dov Grobgeld <dov.grobgeld@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 09:09:49 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Protected against garbage in the CapRTL encoder
+
+---
+ lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c b/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
+index b0c0e4a..f74e010 100644
+--- a/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
++++ b/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
+@@ -232,7 +232,12 @@ fribidi_cap_rtl_to_unicode (
+ 	    }
+ 	}
+       else
+-	us[j++] = caprtl_to_unicode[(int) s[i]];
++      {
++        if ((int)s[i] < 0)
++          us[j++] = '?';
++        else
++          us[j++] = caprtl_to_unicode[(int) s[i]];
++      }
+     }
+ 
+   return j;
diff --git a/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch b/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a1d05c09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 175850b03e1af251d705c1d04b2b9b3c1c06e48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Akira TAGOH <akira@tagoh.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 19:06:10 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix SEGV issue in fribidi_remove_bidi_marks
+
+Escape from fribidi_remove_bidi_marks() immediately if str is null.
+
+This fixes https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/issues/183
+---
+ lib/fribidi.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fribidi.c b/lib/fribidi.c
+index f5da0da..70bdab2 100644
+--- a/lib/fribidi.c
++++ b/lib/fribidi.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (
+   fribidi_boolean status = false;
+ 
+   if UNLIKELY
+-    (len == 0)
++    (len == 0 || str == NULL)
+     {
+       status = true;
+       goto out;
-- 
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