1 files changed, 300 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go b/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ca33f59d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+)
+
+func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() os.Error {
+	finishedHash := newFinishedHash()
+
+	if c.config == nil {
+		c.config = defaultConfig()
+	}
+
+	hello := &clientHelloMsg{
+		vers:               maxVersion,
+		cipherSuites:       c.config.cipherSuites(),
+		compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
+		random:             make([]byte, 32),
+		ocspStapling:       true,
+		serverName:         c.config.ServerName,
+		supportedCurves:    []uint16{curveP256, curveP384, curveP521},
+		supportedPoints:    []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
+	}
+
+	t := uint32(c.config.time())
+	hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
+	hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
+	hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
+	hello.random[3] = byte(t)
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random[4:])
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return os.ErrorString("short read from Rand")
+	}
+
+	finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+	finishedHash.Write(serverHello.marshal())
+
+	vers, ok := mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+	}
+	c.vers = vers
+	c.haveVers = true
+
+	if serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+
+	suite, suiteId := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
+	if suite == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+	}
+
+	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
+	if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+	finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+	certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
+	chain := NewCASet()
+	for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
+		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return os.ErrorString("failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.String())
+		}
+		certs[i] = cert
+		chain.AddCert(cert)
+	}
+
+	// If we don't have a root CA set configured then anything is accepted.
+	// TODO(rsc): Find certificates for OS X 10.6.
+	for cur := certs[0]; c.config.RootCAs != nil; {
+		parent := c.config.RootCAs.FindVerifiedParent(cur)
+		if parent != nil {
+			break
+		}
+
+		parent = chain.FindVerifiedParent(cur)
+		if parent == nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return os.ErrorString("could not find root certificate for chain")
+		}
+
+		if !parent.BasicConstraintsValid || !parent.IsCA {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return os.ErrorString("intermediate certificate does not have CA bit set")
+		}
+		// KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering
+		// Security, Peter Gutmann: A European government CA marked its
+		// signing certificates as being valid for encryption only, but
+		// no-one noticed. Another European CA marked its signature
+		// keys as not being valid for signatures. A different CA
+		// marked its own trusted root certificate as being invalid for
+		// certificate signing.  Another national CA distributed a
+		// certificate to be used to encrypt data for the country’s tax
+		// authority that was marked as only being usable for digital
+		// signatures but not for encryption. Yet another CA reversed
+		// the order of the bit flags in the keyUsage due to confusion
+		// over encoding endianness, essentially setting a random
+		// keyUsage in certificates that it issued. Another CA created
+		// a self-invalidating certificate by adding a certificate
+		// policy statement stipulating that the certificate had to be
+		// used strictly as specified in the keyUsage, and a keyUsage
+		// containing a flag indicating that the RSA encryption key
+		// could only be used for Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+
+		cur = parent
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := certs[0].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
+	}
+
+	c.peerCertificates = certs
+
+	if serverHello.certStatus {
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		}
+		finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
+
+		if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
+			c.ocspResponse = cs.response
+		}
+	}
+
+	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	keyAgreement := suite.ka()
+
+	skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
+	if ok {
+		finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
+		err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hello, serverHello, certs[0], skx)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+			return err
+		}
+
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	transmitCert := false
+	certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
+	if ok {
+		// We only accept certificates with RSA keys.
+		rsaAvail := false
+		for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
+			if certType == certTypeRSASign {
+				rsaAvail = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+
+		// For now, only send a certificate back if the server gives us an
+		// empty list of certificateAuthorities.
+		//
+		// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
+		// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
+		// authorities.  These distinguished names may specify a desired
+		// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; thus,
+		// this message can be used to describe both known roots and a
+		// desired authorization space.  If the certificate_authorities
+		// list is empty then the client MAY send any certificate of the
+		// appropriate ClientCertificateType, unless there is some
+		// external arrangement to the contrary.
+		if rsaAvail && len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
+			transmitCert = true
+		}
+
+		finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
+
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+	finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
+
+	var cert *x509.Certificate
+	if transmitCert {
+		certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
+		if len(c.config.Certificates) > 0 {
+			cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(c.config.Certificates[0].Certificate[0])
+			if err == nil && cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA {
+				certMsg.certificates = c.config.Certificates[0].Certificate
+			} else {
+				cert = nil
+			}
+		}
+		finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
+	}
+
+	preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hello, certs[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	if ckx != nil {
+		finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
+		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
+	}
+
+	if cert != nil {
+		certVerify := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
+		var digest [36]byte
+		copy(digest[0:16], finishedHash.serverMD5.Sum())
+		copy(digest[16:36], finishedHash.serverSHA1.Sum())
+		signed, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey, rsa.HashMD5SHA1, digest[0:])
+		if err != nil {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		certVerify.signature = signed
+
+		finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
+	}
+
+	masterSecret, clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
+		keysFromPreMasterSecret10(preMasterSecret, hello.random, serverHello.random, suite.macLen, suite.keyLen, suite.ivLen)
+
+	clientCipher := suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */ )
+	clientHash := suite.mac(clientMAC)
+	c.out.prepareCipherSpec(clientCipher, clientHash)
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+
+	finished := new(finishedMsg)
+	finished.verifyData = finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
+	finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
+
+	serverCipher := suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */ )
+	serverHash := suite.mac(serverMAC)
+	c.in.prepareCipherSpec(serverCipher, serverHash)
+	c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
+	if c.err != nil {
+		return c.err
+	}
+
+	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+
+	verify := finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
+	if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
+		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+	}
+
+	c.handshakeComplete = true
+	c.cipherSuite = suiteId
+	return nil
+}