path: root/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go

// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

package tls

import (
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"crypto/x509"
	"io"
	"os"
)

func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() os.Error {
	finishedHash := newFinishedHash()

	if c.config == nil {
		c.config = defaultConfig()
	}

	hello := &clientHelloMsg{
		vers:               maxVersion,
		cipherSuites:       c.config.cipherSuites(),
		compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
		random:             make([]byte, 32),
		ocspStapling:       true,
		serverName:         c.config.ServerName,
		supportedCurves:    []uint16{curveP256, curveP384, curveP521},
		supportedPoints:    []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
	}

	t := uint32(c.config.time())
	hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
	hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
	hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
	hello.random[3] = byte(t)
	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random[4:])
	if err != nil {
		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
		return os.ErrorString("short read from Rand")
	}

	finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())

	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
	if !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}
	finishedHash.Write(serverHello.marshal())

	vers, ok := mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
	if !ok {
		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
	}
	c.vers = vers
	c.haveVers = true

	if serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}

	suite, suiteId := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
	if suite == nil {
		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
	}

	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
	if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}
	finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())

	certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
	chain := NewCASet()
	for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
		if err != nil {
			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
			return os.ErrorString("failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.String())
		}
		certs[i] = cert
		chain.AddCert(cert)
	}

	// If we don't have a root CA set configured then anything is accepted.
	// TODO(rsc): Find certificates for OS X 10.6.
	for cur := certs[0]; c.config.RootCAs != nil; {
		parent := c.config.RootCAs.FindVerifiedParent(cur)
		if parent != nil {
			break
		}

		parent = chain.FindVerifiedParent(cur)
		if parent == nil {
			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
			return os.ErrorString("could not find root certificate for chain")
		}

		if !parent.BasicConstraintsValid || !parent.IsCA {
			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
			return os.ErrorString("intermediate certificate does not have CA bit set")
		}
		// KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering
		// Security, Peter Gutmann: A European government CA marked its
		// signing certificates as being valid for encryption only, but
		// no-one noticed. Another European CA marked its signature
		// keys as not being valid for signatures. A different CA
		// marked its own trusted root certificate as being invalid for
		// certificate signing.  Another national CA distributed a
		// certificate to be used to encrypt data for the country’s tax
		// authority that was marked as only being usable for digital
		// signatures but not for encryption. Yet another CA reversed
		// the order of the bit flags in the keyUsage due to confusion
		// over encoding endianness, essentially setting a random
		// keyUsage in certificates that it issued. Another CA created
		// a self-invalidating certificate by adding a certificate
		// policy statement stipulating that the certificate had to be
		// used strictly as specified in the keyUsage, and a keyUsage
		// containing a flag indicating that the RSA encryption key
		// could only be used for Diffie-Hellman key agreement.

		cur = parent
	}

	if _, ok := certs[0].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
	}

	c.peerCertificates = certs

	if serverHello.certStatus {
		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
		if !ok {
			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
		}
		finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())

		if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
			c.ocspResponse = cs.response
		}
	}

	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	keyAgreement := suite.ka()

	skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
	if ok {
		finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
		err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hello, serverHello, certs[0], skx)
		if err != nil {
			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
			return err
		}

		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
	}

	transmitCert := false
	certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
	if ok {
		// We only accept certificates with RSA keys.
		rsaAvail := false
		for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
			if certType == certTypeRSASign {
				rsaAvail = true
				break
			}
		}

		// For now, only send a certificate back if the server gives us an
		// empty list of certificateAuthorities.
		//
		// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
		// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
		// authorities.  These distinguished names may specify a desired
		// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; thus,
		// this message can be used to describe both known roots and a
		// desired authorization space.  If the certificate_authorities
		// list is empty then the client MAY send any certificate of the
		// appropriate ClientCertificateType, unless there is some
		// external arrangement to the contrary.
		if rsaAvail && len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
			transmitCert = true
		}

		finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())

		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
	}

	shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
	if !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}
	finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())

	var cert *x509.Certificate
	if transmitCert {
		certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
		if len(c.config.Certificates) > 0 {
			cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(c.config.Certificates[0].Certificate[0])
			if err == nil && cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA {
				certMsg.certificates = c.config.Certificates[0].Certificate
			} else {
				cert = nil
			}
		}
		finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
	}

	preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hello, certs[0])
	if err != nil {
		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
		return err
	}
	if ckx != nil {
		finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
	}

	if cert != nil {
		certVerify := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
		var digest [36]byte
		copy(digest[0:16], finishedHash.serverMD5.Sum())
		copy(digest[16:36], finishedHash.serverSHA1.Sum())
		signed, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey, rsa.HashMD5SHA1, digest[0:])
		if err != nil {
			return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
		}
		certVerify.signature = signed

		finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
	}

	masterSecret, clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
		keysFromPreMasterSecret10(preMasterSecret, hello.random, serverHello.random, suite.macLen, suite.keyLen, suite.ivLen)

	clientCipher := suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */ )
	clientHash := suite.mac(clientMAC)
	c.out.prepareCipherSpec(clientCipher, clientHash)
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})

	finished := new(finishedMsg)
	finished.verifyData = finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
	finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())

	serverCipher := suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */ )
	serverHash := suite.mac(serverMAC)
	c.in.prepareCipherSpec(serverCipher, serverHash)
	c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
	if c.err != nil {
		return c.err
	}

	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
	if !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}

	verify := finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
	if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
	}

	c.handshakeComplete = true
	c.cipherSuite = suiteId
	return nil
}